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No. 101722-7

IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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No. 83768-1-I

COURT OF APPEALS  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION I

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SIDDHARTH JHA,

Respondent,

v.

VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN and YASSIR  
ANWAR JAMAL,

Appellants.

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**RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REVIEW**

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Carl J. Marquardt, WSBA #23257  
LAW OFFICE OF CARL J. MARQUARDT PLLC  
1126 34<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Suite 311  
Seattle, WA 98122-5137  
Tel: (206) 388-4498

*Attorneys for Respondent*

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## **I. INTRODUCTION AND IDENTITY OF PETITIONER**

This case concerns a new law passed by the Washington Legislature in 2022, the Uniform Public Expressions Protection Act (“UPEPA”). Applying the procedural rules enacted under UPEPA, the trial court came to the correct decision, holding that the Petitioner, Respondent Siddharth Jha (“Jha”) had a meritorious case against Varisha Khan (“Khan”).

However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion regarding two collateral orders seeking an amendment of the complaint. The appellate court also reversed the Order Denying Summary Judgment. Under the pretext of safeguarding one’s free speech rights, the Court of Appeals reached an erroneous decision that misapplied the fair reporting privilege and also drastically curtailed the ability to bring civil rights claims under federal law.

The Court of Appeals reversal is inconsistent with precedent and subverts the Legislature’s intent, warranting review under RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), (4).

## **II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION**

The Court of Appeals issued a published opinion on November 14, 2022 (Appendix page, A2), and denied reconsideration on January 6, 2023 (A32).

## **III. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

The Petitioner presents the following issues for review:

1. Given that UPEPA provides that “this chapter does not apply to a cause of action asserted...under federal law,” does UPEPA’s 14-day amendment window under RCW 4.105.020(1) nevertheless apply to claims under federal law, including civil rights claims brought under Section 1983?
2. For a statement to be privileged under the fair reporting privilege in Washington, must the statement identify unproven allegations as “allegations” or contain similar cautionary words?
3. For the fair reporting privilege to attach in Washington, does a statement have to be attributed to the official record or is a secondhand account adequate?
4. Does a challenged statement that was later changed, obtain protection under UPEPA even where the correction is deficient under the Uniform Correction and Clarification Defamation Act (“UCCDA”)?



## **IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

### **A. Trial Court Procedural History**

#### **1. Khan's UPEPA Motion**

On November 1, 2021, Jha filed a Complaint against Khan. CP 1. On December 17, 2021 Khan brought a 4-in-1 motion seeking relief in the alternative: (i) a Special Motion seeking relief under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act ("UPEPA") (RCW 4.105.020), (ii) a Motion for Summary Judgment under CR 56, (iii) a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under CR 12(c), and (iv) a request under Washington's frivolous filings statute (RCW 4.84.185) (collectively, "UPEPA Motion"). CP 19.

On January 24, 2022, Jha opposed Khan's UPEPA Motion, arguing that (i) Khan could not establish her burden to show that her statements were privileged because she changed her statements about Jha; (ii) Jha could establish that Khan was aware that her statements about Jha were false; (iii) disputes of material fact required denial of her motion; and in the alternative, (iv) Jha's CR 56(f) motion for discovery should be granted. CR 286.

Jha explained that a CR 56(f) continuance was necessary because Khan had made certain disparaging statements about Jha in flyers and printed communications. CP 162; 216. Khan did not deny the existence of such flyers and printed communications. *Id.* Because Khan was the only person who currently had access to the statements, Jha needed a CR 56(f) continuance to obtain that material to be able to respond to Khan's UPEPA Motion. CP 312-13.

On March 1, 2022, the trial court denied Khan's UPEPA Motion on the merits ("Order Denying Summary Judgment"). CP 498. The trial court found that Jha had established a *prima facie* case as to each essential element of his claim for false light, and that genuine issues of material fact existed, including about Varisha Khan's knowledge or reckless disregard of the false statements she made about Jha. *Id.*

## **2. Jha's Good Cause Motion and Jha's Motion to Amend**

On January 12, 2022, Jha filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ("Good Cause Motion"). CP 129. Jha sought leave from the trial court *before* filing his Motion to Amend. Jha explained that

the stay under UPEPA is not absolute and that under RCW 4.105.030(7)(a), a court may, for good cause shown, rule on a motion. *Id.*

Jha explained that the Good Cause Motion only requested a finding of good cause to *allow* Jha to file a Motion to Amend—it was not the Motion to Amend *itself*. *Id.* On February 8, 2022, the trial court found Jha had established good cause to file a motion to add federal claims. (“Good Cause Order”). CP 341.

On February 18, Jha filed a Motion for Leave to File SAC pursuant to CR 15(a) (“Motion to Amend”). CP 345. On March 3—*after* the trial court had denied Khan’s UPEPA Motion on the merits and for unrelated reasons—the trial court granted Jha’s Motion to Amend (“Amendment Order”). CP 515. On March 11, Jha filed his SAC. CP 527. In her Answer, Khan expressed her intention to move this action to federal court. CP 651.

#### **B. Limited Appellate Court Procedural History**

In May 2022, Khan filed a motion asking for accelerated review. In June 2022, Commissioner Koh granted Khan’s

request for accelerated review given the importance of issues in this case. On November 14, 2022, the Court of Appeals issued its published opinion in the matter.

**V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED**

This Court should accept review and (i) reinstate the trial court's Good Cause Order and the Amendment Order because the Court of Appeal's decision limiting Section 1983 claims to a 14-day window under UPEPA conflicts with well-established precedent restricting time limits on civil rights claims, and (ii) reinstate the Order Denying Summary Judgment because the Court of Appeals relied on a fundamentally different interpretation of the fair reporting privilege than long-standing Washington law.

**A. The Court of Appeals Applied the Wrong Standard Under the Fair Reporting Privilege and Khan Was Not Entitled to Summary Judgment Under UPEPA**

**1. Jha's CR 56(f) Request**

The trial court did not address Jha's CR 56(f) request because the trial court denied Khan's UPEPA Motion on the merits and made Jha's CR 56(f) request moot. At the very least, the Court of Appeals should have remanded for consideration

of Jha’s CR 56(f) request. Jha made a CR 56(f) request to obtain material solely in Khan’s possession, and the material that was necessary to respond to Khan’s UPEPA Motion. CP 312-13. UPEPA expressly provides for such limited discovery during the UPEPA imposed stay. *See* RCW 4.105.030(4).

**2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied the Fair Reporting Privilege**

As the trial court correctly found, Khan was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and a genuine dispute over material facts precluded summary judgment. The Court of Appeals was required to construe the facts in light most favorable to the non-moving party—Jha. “[S]ummary judgment is not a substitute for a trial; it exists as a mechanism to decide whether there exists any truly disputed material facts.” *Johnson v. Rothstein*, 52 Wn.App. 303, 305, 759 P.2d 471 (1988).

The Court of Appeals misapplied the fair reporting privilege. The correct inquiry was what was Khan’s source when she made her statements about Jha; not what could globally be attributed to Jha. The fair reporting privilege does not apply in this case because Khan herself admitted that she was not reporting on the lawsuit Jha was involved in. Rather,

Khan was referring to something she purportedly saw online. Here, Khan's own statements defeat application of the fair reporting privilege because what Khan's statements were referring to was not the former lawsuit involving Jha, but rather, what she allegedly read in a second-hand account.

For example, Khan stated her "source [was] The New York Daily News." CP 275. Khan never explained why her "source" was different on summary judgment than what she previously claimed. *Compare* CP 275 with CP 104. Nor did Khan ever explain why what she attached to her declaration is not from The New York Daily News. *Id.* Jha disputes that his or his attorney's name appeared in the media, or that they gave any statement to the media. CP 177, ¶¶10-12; CP 218, ¶50. Thus, there would have been no "public reporting" as Khan contends.

Likewise, Khan claimed "[s]he was dismayed when she received [Jha's] letter and went back to her source, The New York Daily News." CP 275. Who did Khan go to when that source did not even exist? We don't know—and Khan offers no explanation.

The Court of Appeal's opinion appears to acknowledge that it deviates from the application of the fair report privilege. A26, n.13. The Court of Appeals characterized Jha's position as requiring Khan to include a link to the court docket in order fall within the fair reporting privilege. But Jha did not take the position that Khan had to attach a direct link. Rather, Jha stated that Khan could not establish the fair reporting privilege applied because she could not meet the standard promulgated under *Clapp* and *Alpine Industries* as there was nothing in Khan's statements that would have alerted an ordinary reader that what Khan was referring to were allegations in a court case. Her failure to include text as provided under *Clapp* and *Alpine Industries* was fatal to application of the fair report privilege.

Moreover, Khan provided factually inconsistent testimony in her own declaration regarding the two *different* websites Khan identified as her actual "source." There is nothing in the record to show that the website Khan proffered as Exhibit 2 of her declaration was in fact hyperlinked to Khan's website because the URL she *claims* she linked to in her declaration and the URL she *actually* attaches as Exhibit 2 are different. *Compare* URL of CP 104, ¶4:8-9 with URL of CP

113. When Jha raised these issues, Khan admitted that her “declaration was not authenticating the article’s placement on WayBack...” CP 327.

The Court of Appeals misapplied the fair reporting privilege in contravention of long-standing Washington law, including the standard promulgated under *Clapp* and *Alpine Industries*.

### **3. The Court Misapplied the Relevant Inquiry at This Stage**

These factual issues are relevant to the inquiry at the summary judgment stage and the different roles played by the jury and the Court. At this stage, the Court was not deciding whether Khan’s statements about Jha *are in fact* false, but whether they are “*capable* of a defamatory meaning,” either expressly or by implication. *Ernst Home Ctr. v. United Food and Commercial Workers*, 77 Wn.App. 33, 44, 888 P.2d 1196 (1995) (emphasis added). If the statements are *capable* of defamatory meaning, the jury must decide whether they placed Jha in a false light, either expressly or by implication. *Crossman v. The Brick Tavern, Inc.*, 33 Wn.App. 503, 505, 655 P.2d 1206 (1982); *see also* RP, 4. One determining factor in



considering whether statements are capable of a defamatory meaning is if the author changed the challenged statements.

Khan materially (and quietly) changed her statements about Jha *after* she had knowledge of their falsity and then backdated those changes to make it seem like she never made certain false statements in the first place. CP 260. In doing so, Khan constructively admitted their falsity. This alone creates a triable issue. *Palin v. N.Y. Times Co.*, 482 F. Supp. 3d 208, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [a prior] retraction and [a prior] correction may also be probative of a prior intent to [propagate a defamatory statement], for why else the need to correct? Indeed, the correction itself concedes that [defendant’s] initial draft incorrectly stated that there existed [a false statement].”) Khan’s change is an implicit admission on which a jury could find for Jha.

Violating journalism standards is evidence of malice and reckless disregard. *Kerwick v. Orange County Publ’n.*, 53 N.Y.2d 625, 626 (1981). In fact, such violations combined with an admission of the falsity of a statement are sufficient to require a trial—even when a retraction is made. *Id.* at 627. In

*Kerwick*, the publisher claimed an honest mistake; nevertheless the court concluded that a jury trial was required. *Id.* Here, Khan admitted she was not able to verify the statements about Jha. Her admission of falsity and her violation of journalism standards establishes a triable issue of fact.

Despite Khan’s attempts to paint this lawsuit as meritless, the fact remains that as a result of Jha’s correspondence, Khan changed her statements about Jha. They were, however, inadequate “corrections or clarifications” within the meaning of the UCCDA (RCW 7.96.010). For a “correction” to be timely within the meaning of the UCCDA, Khan was required to “disclaim an intent to communicate [a defamatory] meaning or to assert its truth” within 30 days—which she never did. *See* RCW 7.96.070(2)(b)(ii). The Court of Appeals made an erroneous decision to

Finally, the Court of Appeals’ position that Washington does not require a statement that refers to an allegation to be identified as an “allegation” or contain other cautionary words of apparency is wholly inconsistent with Washington law and is a grossly unreasonable reading of the fair report privilege. A22.

Under that unreasonable reading, an allegation and an adjudicated fact would have no distinction.

**B. UPEPA's Procedural Constraints Do Not Apply to Claims Under Federal Law, Including Section 1983 Claims**

The Court's decision holding that Jha was required to bring his Section 1983 claims within the 14-day window under UPEPA conflicts with time-honored precedent that precludes states from enacting laws that impose procedural or substantive hurdles in bringing civil rights claims under Section 1983. Jha urges the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeal's decision to conform to binding precedent.

The U.S. Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that Section 1983 claims are governed solely by a state's residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985). As a result, Jha's Section 1983 claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitation under RCW 4.16.080(2) and cannot be limited to UPEPA's 14-day window under RCW 4.105.020(1).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Because of the stay, the statute of limitations on Jha's Section 1983 claim is tolled during this appeal. *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).

Regardless of the underlying facts or legal theories asserted, *all* Section 1983 claims are governed by the state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. *Wilson*, 471 U.S. at 276. In *Wilson*, the Court explained that this holding flows from 42 U.S.C. §1988(a), which governs the rules of decision applicable to Section 1983 claims. Subjecting Section 1983 claims to varying limitations periods based on the underlying facts or legal theories of associated claims would be repugnant to the remedial goals of Section 1983. *Wilson*, 471 U.S. at 275.

States lack the legal authority to limit the time period to commence a Section 1983 claim. *See e.g., Burnett v. Grattan*, 468 U.S. 42, 43, 104 S.Ct. 2924 (1984) (rejecting six-month limitations period for employment disputes); *Johnson v. Davis*, 582 F.2d 1316, 1317 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting special one-year limitations period for prisoner claims); *Felder v. Casey*, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302 (1988) (rejecting state notice of claim statute as applied to Section 1983 claims brought in state court); *Haywood*, 556 U.S. at 734 (rejecting 90-day notice of claim requirements for Section 1983 claims brought in state court); *Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles*, 631 F.3d

1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The statute of limitations applicable to an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose.”)

In analogous situations where a statute imposes a time window in commencing an action, Washington courts have held such window to be jurisdictional; the statute of limitations under Washington law nevertheless governs civil rights claims. *Nickum v. City of Bainbridge*, 153 Wn. App. 366, 382, 223 P.3d 1172 (2009) (LUPA’s 21-day window was jurisdictional). For purposes of Section 1983 claims, those time limits do not apply. *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356, 382, 110 S.Ct. 2430 (1990) (“The force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can be evaded by the mere mention of the word ‘jurisdiction.’”); *Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.*, 455 U.S. 422, 432-33, 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982).

Limiting Section 1983 claims to the 14-day window under UPEPA violates the Supremacy Clause. Under the Supremacy Clause, a state court may not decline to hear a Section 1983 claim except on the basis of a “neutral jurisdictional rule.” *Haywood v. Drown*, 556 U.S. 729, 735, 129

S.Ct. 2108 (2009); accord *Howlett*, 496 U.S. at 373; *Testa v. Katt*, 330 U.S. 386, 392, 67 S.Ct. 810 (1947) (holding that state courts must hear federal causes of action). Further, under the Supremacy Clause, a statute is jurisdictional only if it reflects “the concerns of power over the person and competence over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to protect.” *Howlett*, 496 U.S. at 381.

For example, the Supreme Court has held that venue and *forum non conveniens* rules are jurisdictional because they reflect a court’s limited power over persons and events beyond the state’s geographic boundaries. See, e.g., *Herb v. Pitcairn*, 324 U.S. 117, 123, 65 S.Ct. 459 (1945) (upholding state court’s refusal to hear federal cause of action based on state statute preventing the court from hearing actions arising outside the state’s physical boundaries); *Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield*, 340 U.S. 1, 4, 71 S.Ct. 1 (1950) (upholding state *forum non conveniens* rule as applied to federal cause of action). UPEPA’s 14-day window does not reflect any similar concerns.

In addition, UPEPA’s 14-day window may not be applied to Section 1983 claims because it would unfairly single out

Section 1983 claims for disparate treatment. In *Haywood*, the Supreme Court struck down a similar New York law that divested trial courts of jurisdiction from hearing Section 1983 claims. *Haywood*, 556 U.S. at 731. The New York law redirected those claims to the state court of claims and put plaintiffs at a procedural disadvantage by requiring them to comply with, *inter alia*, a 90-day notice of claim requirement. *Id.* at 734. The court struck down that law and held that “having made the decision to create courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it considers at odds with its local policy.” *Id.* at 740.

Like the state law struck down in *Haywood*, UPEPA’s 14-day limitations period singles out a discrete subset of Section 1983 claims for disparate treatment and increased procedural hurdles. Imposing additional procedural hurdles on those most deserving of access to courts undermines the remedial goals of Section 1983.

Any tethering Section 1983 claims to UPEPA’s 14-day window threatens to improperly curtail the enforcement of fundamental civil rights. And where, as here, the basis of Jha’s

Section 1983 claim is Khan’s abuse of office stemming from her intentional failure to recuse herself out of spite for Jha and her behind-the-scenes official misconduct, refusing to allow citizens the right to hold their elected officials accountable threatens to suppress a bedrock of democracy.

UPEPA expressly provides that the *entirety* of UPEPA does not apply to federal claims, *including* the 14-day window the Court of Appeals relied on. *See* RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii) (“**this chapter does not apply to a cause of action asserted...under federal law**”) (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals decision conflicts with the statutory text. RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii) uses the phrase “*this chapter*”. Use of “*this chapter*” suggests that the 14-day window under UPEPA was never intended to apply to the causes of actions enumerated under RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii), which include claims under federal law.

Moreover, this Court is bound to follow the statutory text of *Washington* law—not the model law promulgated by the ULC, which is based on California’s anti-SLAPP law. This Court has previously cautioned that courts must give deference to how Washington’s law is written, notwithstanding any



differences. *Davis v. Cox*, 183 Wn.2d 269, 284 (2015) (“discussing some of the similarities and differences between the two statutes and concluding that because Washington modeled its statute on California’s, Washington courts must give effect to the differences in our anti-SLAPP statute”); *Davis*, 183 Wn.2d at 284 (“Where our legislature borrows a statute from another source but makes certain deviations from that source, ‘we are bound to conclude’ the legislature’s deviation ‘was purposeful and evidenced its intent’ to differ from the original source on the particular issue.”)

Finally, the Court cannot reframe a motion seeking to add a cause of action under federal law as one that “relates to” the UPEPA Motion simply because such a request seeks to amend the complaint to assert an exempt cause of action enumerated under RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii). Doing so would negate the obvious limitation imposed by RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii). If the *chapter* does not apply to one of the causes of action asserted under RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii), then, by definition, a motion seeking to assert a cause of action under RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(xii) cannot relate to a UPEPA motion. If that were the case, the limitations imposed by RCW

4.105.010(3)(a)(xii) would have no meaning. *Lamie v. United States Trustee*, 540 U.S. 526, 537 (2004) (“there is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted”).

Under binding precedent, the Court of Appeals should not have limited Jha’s Section 1983 claim to UPEPA’s 14-day window. *Wilson*, 471 U.S. at 273, 276; *Owens*, 488 U.S. at 236. Doing so conflicts with established precedent that expressly limits the imposition of procedural or substantive limitations on civil rights claims.

**C. Anti-SLAPP Laws Do Not Apply to Federal Causes of Action**

The Court of Appeal’s decision runs contrary to established precedent holding that anti-SLAPP laws cannot be used to stymie claims under federal law. *Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (“anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal law causes of action”); *Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc.*, 448 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1180-82 (C.D.Cal. 2006); cf. *Martinez v. California*, 444

U.S. 282, 284 n.8 (1980) (claims “under 42 U.S.C. §1983...cannot be immunized by state law[.]”)

The Court’s decision appears to misconstrue the term “unrelated” under RCW 4.105.030. *See* RCW 4.105.030(7) (“[d]uring a stay under this section, the court for good cause may hear and rule on...[a] **motion unrelated to the motion under RCW 4.105.020**”) (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals concluded that because Jha sought to amend his complaint to include an exempt cause of action, he was limited to doing so within the 14-day period. That conclusion is predicated on the premise that it was the *act* of amending the complaint that related to Khan’s UPEPA motion and not the underlying cause of action sought to be added.

But the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the Good Cause and Amendment Orders are “inextricably related” with Khan’s UPEPA Motion and were limited to a 14-day window is contrary to the plain reading of the statute and the direction provided in *Hilton*. In *Hilton*, the court held that even a defendant’s own motion to dismiss pertaining to the same cause of action that was the subject of the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was not “inextricably intertwined” for the purposes of

anti-SLAPP consideration. *Hilton*, 599 F.3d at 901. The *Hilton* court explained that because a defendant's own motion to dismiss did not impede consideration of their anti-SLAPP motion, it could not have been held to be directly related to the underlying anti-SLAPP motion. *Id.*

Comparing the motions practice in *Hilton* with Jha's request to add federal claims, Jha's request does not run afoul of UPEPA. To be clear, Jha sought to add a federal claim not because it was expressly disallowed by UPEPA, but because he had a meritorious federal claim against Khan.

Moreover, Jhas' request to amend to add federal claims stemming from Khan's abuse of office cannot be "inextricably related" to her UPEPA Motion because (i) it was not used by the trial court to make a decision on Khan's UPEPA Motion; (ii) the relief sought under the Motion for Good Cause/Motion to Amend was not predicate to resolving Khan's UPEPA Motion; (iii) the Motion to Amend was filed *after* the trial court had already found good cause to do so; and (iv) Motion for Good Cause/Motion to Amend did not impact the timing or consideration of Khan's UPEPA Motion.

In every procedural or substantive way, Jha's request to add federal claims had no bearing on the determination of Khan's UPEPA Motion. The Court of Appeals misapplied RCW 4.105.030(7) when it effectively held that the mere fact that Jha had sought to amend his complaint was a sufficient basis to hold that Jha's request was "related to" Khan's UPEPA Motion. The relevant inquiry should have been what relief Jha sought by way of his Motion to Amend and whether that requested relief would impede the determination of Khan's UPEPA Motion.

**D. Khan Should Not Be Allowed to Use UPEPA as a Means to Shield Her Abuse of Office and Official Misconduct**

In addition, public policy requires that the Court refrain from setting a troubling precedent that allows elected officials to avoid liability for abuse of office and official misconduct under the procedural protections intended for free speech. To do so would allow elected officials the opportunity to misuse UPEPA as a means to avoid accountability.

In Redmond, Khan had a *mandatory* duty to recuse herself when she *might* have a conflict of interest. CP 713.

Despite that mandatory duty, her intentional failure to recuse out of spite for Jha was an abuse of office. RCW 9A.80.010; RCW 42.20.100. The definition of what constitutes a conflict of interest and requires recusal in the municipal context is broad. CP 870. In Redmond and elsewhere, councilmembers recuse themselves for conflicts of interest stemming from personal litigation and financial conflicts. CP 874-75; 877.

As Jha explained in greater detail in later briefing (recognizing that a Motion to Amend is not proper forum for a fact-intensive inquiry), Khan's conflict of interest requiring her recusal was not caused by her online statements about Jha. Rather, it was because of (i) Khan's ongoing *personal* legal issue with Jha that prohibited her from objectively presiding over Jha's land use application in her *official* capacity, and (ii) Khan's improper personal construction loan from Jha's engineer—Luay Joudeh of DR Strong Consulting Engineers—the same engineer that worked on Jha's land use proposal that was the subject of Khan's vote. CP 320; 500; CP 691-96.

The interrelated issues that caused a conflict of interest and precluded Khan from voting on Jha's land use proposal where Joudeh was involved were: (i) Khan's personal loan from

Joudeh at terms unavailable to the general public, (ii) Khan's purchase of real estate from Joudeh, (iii) Khan's failure to pay King County property taxes on improvements Khan constructed with Joudeh's help, (iv) Joudeh's role as Khan's engineer on the construction of her personal residence, (v) Joudeh's payment of tens of thousands of permit fees for the construction of Khan's personal residence, (iv) Joudeh's role as project engineer for Jha, and (v) Joudeh's work on Jha's property that was the subject of Khan's land use vote. CP 691-96; 829-31.

Khan's financial conflict of interest and her resulting behind the scenes misconduct with two other councilmembers out of spite for Jha is actionable under Section 1983 because they occurred during the land use process.

A long line of cases have held that torts committed during the land use review process, including those stemming from conflicted decision-makers and corrupt elected officials, are proper under Section 1983. *Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cnty.*, 191 Wn.2d 392, 429 (2018) *abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle*, 194 Wn.2d 682 (2019) ("It is well established that acts occurring during the land use decision-making process can form the basis for Section 1983

claims.”); *Maytown*, 191 Wn.2d at 435-36 (allowing Section 1983 claim when elected official “deliberately interfered with the impartiality of the...decision-making process” because “[t]he right to an impartial decision-maker is clearly a right ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”); *Mission Springs v. City of Spokane*, 134 Wn.2d 947, 967 (1998) (Section 1983 proper because actions of city councilmembers causing injury was “the moving force of the constitutional violation.”); *Kaahumanu v. County of Maui*, 315 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 claim proper against councilmembers in their individual capacities for acts taken in their official capacities after the council voted to deny a permit).

Khan’s conflict of interest not only required her recusal, it also barred her from engaging in behind-the-scenes efforts to improperly influence other councilmembers. *Cf. Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan*, 564 U.S. 117, 121, 131 S.Ct. 2343 (2011) (conflict of interest “not only prohibits the legislator who has a conflict from voting on the proposal in question, but also forbids him to ‘advocate the passage or failure’ of the proposal”).



Khan's official misconduct was real; she and her husband apparently obtained illicit financial benefits totaling thousands of dollars from Luay Joudeh, including some at the expense of King County taxpayers. That relationship, regardless of how improper it was, also caused a conflict of interest for Khan with Jha. Khan's misappropriation of the public trust and her abuse of office threatens to imperil bedrock of our democratic values. RCW 9A.80.010; RCW 42.20.100. Khan cannot be allowed to circumvent liability under the guise of exercising a constitutional right—especially where UPEPA does not apply to federal claims.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

This Court should accept discretionary review and reinstate the orders entered by the trial court. By depriving the trial court of the flexibility to conduct a good cause analysis beyond the 14-day window, the Court's decision threatens to unduly restrict a trial court's ability to fashion an appropriate remedy.

The undersigned certifies this document contains 4,982.  
words in compliance with the word limits under RAP 18.17.

DATED: February 6, 2023.

Law Office of Carl J. Marquardt, PLLC

By: /s/ Carl Marquardt\_\_\_\_\_

Carl J. Marquardt, WSBA #23257  
1126 34<sup>th</sup> Ave., Suite 311  
Seattle, WA 98122-5137  
Telephone: 206-388-4498  
E-mail: carl@cjmpllc.com

*Attorneys for Respondent*

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this date I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing document to be served upon the following, at the addresses stated below, via the method of service indicated.

### DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

Bruce E.H. Johnson  
Caesar Kalinowski  
920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300  
Seattle, WA 98104  
brucejohnson@dwt.com  
caesarkalinowski@dwt.com

<input type="checkbox"/>	E-mail
<input type="checkbox"/>	U.S. Mail
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	E-filing

Dated this 6<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2023 in Seattle, Washington.

/s/ Carl Marquardt  
Carl J. Marquardt, WSBA #23257

No. \_\_\_\_\_

IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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No. 83768-1-I

COURT OF APPEALS  
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DIVISION I

---

SIDDHARTH JHA,

Respondent,

v.

VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN and YASSIR  
ANWAR JAMAL,

Appellants.

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**APPENDIX TO RESPONDENT'S  
PETITION FOR REVIEW**

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Carl J. Marquardt, WSBA #23257  
LAW OFFICE OF CARL J. MARQUARDT PLLC  
1126 34<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Suite 311  
Seattle, WA 98122-5137  
Tel: (206) 388-4498

*Attorneys for Respondent*

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DATED: February 6, 2023.

Law Office of Carl J. Marquardt, PLLC

By: /s/ Carl Marquardt

Carl J. Marquardt, WSBA #23257  
1126 34<sup>th</sup> Ave., Suite 311  
Seattle, WA 98122-5137  
Telephone: 206-388-4498  
E-mail: carl@cjmp LLC.com

*Attorneys for Respondent*

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Bruce E.H. Johnson  
Caesar Kalinowski  
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  
920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300  
Seattle, WA 98104  
brucejohnson@dwt.com  
caesarkalinowski@dwt.com

<input type="checkbox"/>	E-mail
<input type="checkbox"/>	U.S. Mail
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	E-filing

Dated this 6<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2023 in Seattle, Washington.

/s/ Carl Marquardt  
Carl J. Marquardt, WSBA #23257

# **APPENDIX A**

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

SIDDHARTH JHA,

Respondent,

v.

VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN and  
YASSIR ANWAR JAMAL, wife and  
husband,

Appellants.

DIVISION ONE

No. 83768-1-I

PUBLISHED OPINION

DWYER, J. — Today we are charged with resolving the first appellate dispute arising from invocation of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, chapter 4.105 RCW (UPEPA). In 2021, our legislature became the first in the country to enact this uniform act. This legislative action followed on the heels of the perceived failure of Washington’s prior anti-SLAPP<sup>1</sup> statute, former RCW 4.24.525 (2010), to achieve the societal goals sought by the legislature.

Herein, a private citizen and property developer, Siddharth Jha, brought a common law tort action against a political candidate, Varisha Khan, based on unflattering statements regarding Jha made by Khan during the course of her campaign. After giving Jha proper notice of her intent to do so, Khan moved to dismiss Jha’s complaint as allowed by the uniform act. The trial court denied the

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<sup>1</sup> Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.



motion. As also allowed by the uniform act, Khan took an immediate appeal. Because the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss, we reverse.

I

Siddharth Jha filed an invasion of privacy by false light claim against Varisha Khan and her spouse Yassir Jamal, based on statements Khan made about him in an article she wrote for her campaign for the Redmond City Council. Khan moved to dismiss Jha's complaint under UPEPA. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Jha presented issues of material fact. Because the motion should have been granted, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment in Khan's favor.

In 2019, Varisha Khan ran for election to a position on the Redmond City Council against incumbent Hank Myers. As part of her campaign, Khan wrote an article directed to the voters of Redmond and published it on [medium.com](https://medium.com). Khan's article, entitled "Vote for ethical, bold leadership in Redmond, WA," focused on her opponent and her view that Myers put the interests of developers ahead of the interests of Redmond residents. The article reads, in relevant part:

It's reasonable to expect ethical, principled leadership from our elected officials, including at the local level. It's what we deserve. Unfortunately, my opponent in this race, Hank Myers, has a history of taking money from developers and putting their interests above the public interest.

During this election year, Myers voted in support of developer proposals whom he took money from: Fred Proctor, who gave Myers \$400 and Sidd Jha, who gave the \$1,000 maximum donation and was recently involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse of his ex-girlfriend.

Jha's proposal failed two years ago and once again does not meet the majority of planning requirements, but Myers voted yes anyway. The proposal passed, thus threatening to create a dangerous precedent where developers can disregard public transparency.<sup>[2]</sup>

Sidd Jha, aka Siddharth Jha, is the respondent herein. In June 2019, Jha's ex-girlfriend (hereinafter A.S.) filed a lawsuit against him in New York state court. In her complaint, A.S. made numerous allegations detailing Jha's abuse, including, but not limited to, physical violence, persuading her to retract statements made to the police, controlling her finances, and tracking her movements via cell phone. A.S. further alleged that Jha had sent to her family members and employer multiple nude and/or sexual images of her. For his part, Jha contends that the New York lawsuit was a "sham" brought by A.S. to cover up her own misdeeds.

On November 1, 2021, Jha filed a lawsuit against Khan, asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, invasion of privacy by publicity given to private facts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On November 4, 2021, Khan sent Jha a written notice of Khan's intent to file a motion to dismiss under UPEPA. This triggered a 14-day window within which Jha could either withdraw or amend his complaint. RCW 4.105.020(1). Jha took no action until over a month later.

As promised, Khan filed her UPEPA motion to dismiss on December 17,

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<sup>2</sup> On appeal, Jha also claims that Khan made other false statements about him in flyers. These statements were not identified or referenced in either his original or first amended complaints, and there is no evidence of them in our record. "This court will not consider allegations of fact without support in the record." Lemond v. Dep't of Licensing, 143 Wn. App. 797, 807, 180 P.3d 829 (2008).

2021. This filing triggered an automatic stay of the proceedings. RCW 4.105.030.

Jha filed his first amended complaint on January 12, 2022. This complaint removed all claims except invasion of privacy by false light while containing the same factual allegations as contained in the original complaint. Khan interposed no objection to the amendments. Also on January 12, 2022, Jha filed a “Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.” In this motion, Jha indicated that he sought to file a second amended complaint in order to add unspecified federal causes of action. Khan opposed the motion. On February 8, 2022, the trial court granted Jha’s motion, permitting him to move to amend his complaint.

The hearing on Khan’s UPEPA motion to dismiss took place on February 14, 2022. After entertaining argument from both parties, the trial court stated that it would take the matter under advisement and review relevant authorities before issuing an order.

On February 18, 2022, before the trial court had issued its ruling on the UPEPA motion, Jha moved to file his second amended complaint. Jha’s proposed second amended complaint added two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.<sup>3</sup>

The trial court issued its order on Khan’s UPEPA motion on March 1, 2022.

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.



Therein, the trial court determined that

(a) plaintiff has established a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action of invasion of privacy by false light, and (b) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding, without limitation, the existence and scope of the alleged falsity and Khan's knowledge or reckless disregard of the alleged falsity.

The trial court also indicated that it believed there were unresolved material issues of fact concerning whether Khan's speech was protected by the First Amendment. On March 3, 2022, the trial court granted Jha's motion to file his second amended complaint. Jha filed his second amended complaint on March 11, 2022, eight days after Khan filed a notice of appeal.<sup>4</sup>

II

In 2020, the Uniform Law Commission drafted UPEPA as a means to combat "an abusive type of litigation called a 'SLAPP' or 'strategic lawsuit against public participation.'" UNIF. L. COMM'N, THE UNIFORM PUBLIC EXPRESSION PROTECTION ACT (2020): A SUMMARY 1 (undated),

<https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=dcbe7300-b708-66eb-843a-8a66ddf3ad7b&forceDialog=1>.

The Washington legislature enacted UPEPA in 2021. LAWS OF 2021, ch. 259. In doing so, Washington became the first state to adopt this uniform act.<sup>5</sup>

Similar to its predecessor statute, the Washington Act Limiting Strategic

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<sup>4</sup> In response to the brief submitted by amicus, Jha submitted an untimely and overlength brief. We accept the brief, despite its untimely status, but strike all content after the 2,500th word.

<sup>5</sup> Kentucky and Hawaii have since enacted UPEPA. Public Expression Protection Act: Enactment History, UNIF. L. COMM'N, <https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=4f486460-199c-49d7-9fac-05570be1e7b1> (last updated Oct. 28, 2022); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 454.460-.478; 2022 Haw. Sess. Laws act 96.

Lawsuits Against Public Participation, former RCW 4.24.525, UPEPA provides for early adjudication of baseless claims aimed at preventing an individual from exercising the constitutional right of free speech. Unlike its predecessor, however, UPEPA incorporates standards for adjudication that mirror those utilized in Civil Rules 12 and 56.

Pursuant to RCW 4.105.020(2), a party to a lawsuit may file a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss any cause of action “to which this chapter applies” within 60 days of service of the complaint. Before the party may do so, it must first provide notice of its intent to seek dismissal at least 14 days before filing the UPEPA dismissal motion in the trial court. RCW 4.105.020(1). During this 14-day period, the responding party may withdraw or amend its pleading “in accordance with applicable court rules.” RCW 4.105.020(1).

Chapter 4.105 RCW applies to any claim asserted “against a person based on the person’s:”

- (a) Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;
- (b) Communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;
- (c) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Washington state Constitution, on a matter of public concern.

RCW 4.105.010(2). There are certain exceptions to this rule, which are enumerated in RCW 4.105.010(3)(a).

It is the moving party’s burden to establish that UPEPA applies to the cause of action. RCW 4.105.060(1)(a). Once the moving party has satisfied this

requirement, the burden shifts to the responding party to establish that a statutory exception applies. RCW 4.105.060(1)(b). If the responding party does not demonstrate that an exception applies, the trial court *must* dismiss the action if either:

- (i) The responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action; or
- (ii) The moving party establishes that:
  - (A) The responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; or
  - (B) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part of the cause of action.

RCW 4.105.060(1). If the moving party prevails on the UPEPA motion, the trial court must award the party its costs, reasonable attorney fees, and reasonable litigation expenses. RCW 4.105.090(1).

UPEPA dictates that all provisions of the act “must be broadly construed and applied to protect the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and of the press, the right to assemble and petition, and the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Washington state Constitution.” RCW 4.105.901. UPEPA also dictates that, “[i]n applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.” RCW 4.105.902. Thus far, to our knowledge, no other state appellate court has issued a precedential decision applying or construing UPEPA.

III

In assessing whether the trial court erred by denying Khan’s UPEPA



motion, we engage in the three-step analysis dictated by RCW 4.105.060(1). The trial court's order on Khan's motion does not specifically address the first step in the UPEPA analysis, whether the statute applies to Jha's cause of action. Jha asserts that the statute does not apply because Khan's statements were not on a matter of public concern. We disagree.

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Pacific County v. Comcast of Wash. IV, Inc., 8 Wn. App. 2d 418, 449, 438 P.3d 1212 (2019). Similarly, we review summary judgment-like orders de novo, viewing all evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Boyd v. Sunflower Props., LLC, 197 Wn. App. 137, 142, 389 P.3d 626 (2016).

UPEPA applies to a complaint or cause of action when it is asserted against a person based on the person's "[e]xercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Washington state Constitution, on a matter of public concern." RCW 4.105.010(2)(c). Whether speech is a matter of public concern is a question of law, which courts must determine "by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Billings v. Town of Steilacoom, 2 Wn. App. 2d 1, 31, 408 P.3d 1123 (2017) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 148 n.7, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983)). We have previously held that "[s]peech involves 'matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.'" Spratt v. Toft, 180 Wn. App. 620, 632, 324 P.3d 707 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011)).

Reviewing the statements made by Khan in context, it is apparent that her speech was a matter of public concern. The statements with which Jha takes issue are a small part of a much larger article concerning Khan's political opponent, Hank Myers. Specifically, the article posits that councilmember Myers votes in the interest of unsavory business interests and political financiers rather than his constituents and urges Redmond residents to vote for Khan as the better alternative. The official activities of an elected representative are without question a matter of public concern. Furthermore, a political candidate "has a protected right to speak in furtherance of [her] candidacy." Spratt, 180 Wn. App. at 630 (citing Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 434 (9th Cir.2014)).

Jha's argument to the contrary is unavailing. First, Jha reads Khan's article in the narrowest way possible, rather than as a whole as the law dictates. Second, the case upon which Jha relies, Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wn.2d 199, 189 P.3d 139 (2008), is both factually and legally inapplicable to this case. Factually, the records analyzed in Bellevue John Does were documents pertaining to an internal investigation conducted by a school district. Court records differ from government employee records in that there is a constitutional presumption of public concern as to the former. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("Justice in all cases shall be administered openly."). Legally, Bellevue John Does concerned the interpretation of an exception to the Public



Records Act,<sup>6</sup> which must be construed narrowly. 164 Wn.2d at 209. Here, however, we concern ourselves with a statute that the legislature has dictated must be construed broadly. RCW 4.105.901. Given the broad construction that must be given to “matter of public concern,” we hold that Khan’s statements fall within that definition. UPEPA therefore applies.

IV

Under the second step of the UPEPA analysis, the trial court found that Jha established a prima facie claim of invasion of privacy by false light. Khan asserts that this was erroneous because Jha did not make the requisite showing that the statements she made were false. We agree.

“Washington has adopted *Restatement (Second) of Torts* § 652E (Am. Law Inst. 1977), recognizing invasion of privacy by false light as an independent claim.” Seaquist v. Caldier, 8 Wn. App. 2d 556, 564, 438 P.3d 606 (2019). To establish a prima facie claim for invasion of privacy by false light, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has publicized a statement placing them in a false light, so long as “(a) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) the actor knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the publication and the false light in which the other would be placed.” Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 470-71, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Although the plaintiff need not be defamed, there must nevertheless be some showing of falsity. Seaquist, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 573.

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<sup>6</sup> Ch. 42.56 RCW.

The parties first dispute whether a prima facie claim of false light requires the plaintiff to establish that the speaker acted with actual malice as to the falsity of the statement or whether mere negligence is sufficient. This dispute arises because the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974), did not specify whether the actual malice standard it announced was applicable to false light as well as defamation claims. The result has been a split of authority among the states, with some applying the actual malice standard to false light claims, while others limit the actual malice standard solely to defamation claims. See Pfannenstiel v. Osborne Publ'g Co., 939 F. Supp. 1497, 1503 (D. Kan. 1996) (discussing split of authority). Our Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on this debate. We need not resolve this question today, as we hold that Jha has not established a prima facie claim of invasion of privacy by false light under either standard. We so hold because Jha has not presented evidence that any of Khan's statements are false.

In his complaint, Jha alleged that two statements made by Khan in her article placed him in a false light. First, Jha alleged that Khan's statement that he "was recently involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse of his ex-girlfriend" was false. Second, Jha alleged that Khan's statement that he "disregard[ed] public transparency" was false. We analyze each of these statements in turn.

V

Khan asserts that the trial court erred by finding that there were material issues of fact as to the falsity of her statement that Jha was “involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse of his ex-girlfriend.” This is so, Khan asserts, because the statement was true. We agree.

No prima facie case of invasion of privacy by false light exists if the statement is true. Emeson v. Dep’t of Corr., 194 Wn. App. 617, 640, 376 P.3d 430 (2016). “A ‘provably false statement’ is one that, as a statement of either fact or opinion, falsely expresses or implies provable facts about the plaintiff.” Seaquist, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 565-66 (quoting Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 87 Wn. App. 579, 590-91, 943 P.2d 350 (1997)). When determining whether a statement is false, the court considers the statement in context and construes it by its ordinary meaning. Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 114 Wn. App. 371, 387, 57 P.3d 1178, 64 P.3d 49 (2002); accord Seaquist, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 566. The court “may not extend language by innuendo or by the conclusions of the pleader.” Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 20 Wn. App. 229, 234, 580 P.2d 642 (1978).

Jha does not deny that he was in fact sued by his ex-girlfriend and that the complaint in that matter contains allegations of abuse and revenge porn. Rather, Jha asserts that this statement creates the false *implication* that he engaged in abuse and distributing revenge porn.<sup>7</sup> No Washington court has yet addressed

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<sup>7</sup> Jha also repeatedly argues that the New York lawsuit was a “sham.” In his statement of additional authorities, filed after oral argument in this court, Jha cites to Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1249, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983), to argue that a “sham” lawsuit is not



whether a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of invasion of privacy by false light when the claimed falsity is implicit rather than explicit.<sup>8</sup> We hold that while a false implication may support a claim of false light, Jha has not presented evidence that Khan published any statements implying false facts about him.

Our Supreme Court has recognized that defamation by implication is a viable theory of recovery in Washington. Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 822, 108 P.3d 768 (2005); but see Yeakey v. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 787, 792, 234 P.3d 332 (2010) (rejecting discussion of defamation by implication in Mohr as dicta). “Defamation by implication occurs when ‘the defendant juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them, or creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts.’” Corey v. Pierce County, 154 Wn. App. 752, 761-62, 225 P.3d 367 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 823).

Not only are false light and defamation highly similar, but the Supreme Court has noted that “all defamation cases are potentially false light cases.” Eastwood, 106 Wn.2d at 471. If a plaintiff may be defamed by implication, and if all defamation may give rise to a false light claim, then logic dictates that a plaintiff may be placed in a false light by implication.

However, a statement does not imply false facts merely because someone might draw a negative conclusion from it. “Merely omitting facts favorable to the

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considered a lawsuit at all. Even if respondent’s brief could be read to have contained this argument (it did not), the portion of the case to which Jha cites is the opinion of the dissenting judge. Because dissents are not controlling precedent, we do not consider this argument further.

<sup>8</sup> Division Two agrees that this remains an open question. See Seaquist, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 573 n.4.

plaintiff or facts that the plaintiff thinks should have been included does not make a publication false.” Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 827. Rather, “the plaintiff must show with respect to the element of falsity that the communication left a false impression that would be contradicted by the inclusion of omitted facts.” Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 827. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s view that a statement could be defamatory if the inclusion of additional facts would make it “less arbitrary and insensitive.” Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 830 (quoting Mohr v. Grant, 117 Wn. App. 75, 88, 68 P.3d 1159 (2003)).

Khan’s statement does not imply any false facts about Jha. The statement that Jha was involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse does not, on its own, create the implication that Jha actually engaged in revenge porn and abuse. Indeed, in Sisley v. Seattle School District No. 1, 171 Wn. App. 227, 229, 235, 286 P.3d 974 (2012), we held that a news article stating that the plaintiffs “have also been accused of racist renting policies” did not transform the gist of the story into a statement that the plaintiffs “*are* racist landlords.” Similarly, Khan’s statement that Jha was “involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse” does not imply that Jha was *engaged* in revenge porn and abuse. This conclusion is not readily apparent from Khan’s article; it is merely one that Jha himself draws.

Although not binding on our court, the opinion in Rogers v. Mroz, 502 P.3d 986 (Ariz. 2022), is instructive. In that case, Wendy Rogers and Steve Smith were rival candidates in a primary election for United States Representative. Rogers, 502 P.3d at 989. At the time, Smith was employed by Young Agency, a

talent agency that represented a significant number of minors. Rogers, 502 P.3d at 989. As part of her campaign, Rogers ran a radio advertisement that expressed these thoughts:

“Tom O’Halloran is a dangerous leftist and ally of Nancy Pelosi and the open borders lobby, but he’ll win again if we run Steve Smith for Congress. Smith is a slimy character whose modeling agency specializes in underage girls and advertises on websites linked to sex trafficking. Smith opposed Trump, never endorsed Trump against Clinton and ridiculed our much needed border wall.

Who’ll beat O’Halloran? Wendy Rogers. Wendy Rogers strongly supports President Trump and the President’s conservative agenda. Wendy Rogers is a decorated Air Force pilot, small business owner, and major supporter of President Trump’s border wall. Slimy Steve Smith can’t beat O’Halloran and the anti-Trump left. Only Wendy Rogers will.”

Rogers, 502 P.3d at 989. Young Agency and its owner (collectively Young) sued Rogers for defamation and invasion of privacy by false light. Rogers, 502 P.3d at 989. Although it was true that Young’s advertisements had appeared on websites linked to sex trafficking, Young asserted that Rogers’ statement implied that Young was complicit in the sex trafficking of children. Rogers, 502 P.3d at 989. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected this contention.

The court did so after examining the statement in context, noting that the statement was part of a political smear campaign against Smith, with Young playing only a “supporting role.” Rogers, 502 P.3d at 994. The court further noted that, while there could be many implications if the statement about the modeling agency was viewed in isolation, the radio advertisement as a whole supplied the implication to listeners: Smith was “slimy.” Rogers, 502 P.3d at 994. The court concluded that “[t]he assertion that the contested statement implies



that Young is complicit in sex trafficking is simply too remote to infer on behalf of a reasonable listener in the context of an attack ad directed toward a specific named individual that aims to prove he is slimy.” Rogers, 502 P.3d at 994. The court stated that if the claim was allowed to proceed, it would open the floodgates to anyone referenced in a political campaign, which would intolerably chill the right to free speech. Rogers, 502 P.3d at 995. The court thus concluded that Young had not established a material issue of fact concerning the falsity of Rogers’ advertisement. Rogers, 502 P.3d at 995.

Just as with the statement in Rogers, the allegedly false statement herein was a small part of a larger attack advertisement against an identified political opponent. More compellingly, the statement cited by Jha was a mere one sentence of a four-page article. As in Rogers, Khan supplied the inference that she wished her readers to draw: that Hank Myers was “bought by developers” and put their interests above the interests of Redmond residents. The “gist” of the article, when viewed as a whole, has nothing to do with Jha; instead, the gist is that Myers is unworthy to serve on the Redmond City Council.

Finally, Washington, like Arizona, recognizes that the right to free speech is especially important during political campaigns and a certain amount of inflammatory rhetoric is to be expected. Sequist, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 566-67 (stating that “the First Amendment applies to the fullest extent during a political campaign” and “audiences here . . . would fully expect political campaign materials to be saturated with mischaracterizations, rhetoric, and exaggeration”); Rogers, 502 P.3d at 995 (“[I]n public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and

even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” (citations omitted) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1988))). Viewing the statement about Jha in the context of the article in which it appeared, it cannot reasonably be read to imply anything false.

VI

Similarly, Jha has not presented evidence to support his contention that the statement that he “disregard[ed] public transparency”<sup>9</sup> is false. This is so because the statement is an opinion, for which liability cannot attach.

A prima facie case of false light cannot be established if the challenged statement constitutes an opinion, as “[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339. The determination of whether a statement is fact or opinion is a question of law. Benjamin v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 37 Wn. App. 916, 922, 684 P.2d 739 (1984). When determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, we consider:

- (1) the entire article and not merely a particular phrase or sentence;
- (2) the degree to which the truth or falsity of a statement can be objectively determined without resort to speculation; and
- (3) whether ordinary persons hearing or reading the matter perceive the statement as an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact.

Benjamin, 37 Wn. App. at 922-23. “Even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of opinions, and thus be privileged, when made in ‘public debate, heated labor dispute, or other circumstances in which an audience may

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<sup>9</sup> Br. of Resp’t at 33-34.



anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole.” Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wn. App. 29, 41, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)).

Jha selectively quotes Khan’s article to claim that Khan accused him of “disregard[ing] public transparency.”<sup>10</sup> Khan’s actual statement, however, was that “Jha’s proposal failed two years ago and once again does not meet the majority of planning requirements, but Myers voted yes anyway. The proposal passed, thus threatening to create a dangerous precedent where developers can disregard public transparency.”

This is a statement about what Khan fears might happen in the future if Myers were reelected. As a predictive statement, it is incapable of being proved and thus cannot be deemed a fact. Furthermore, “disregard[ing] public policy” is an ambiguous statement that no ordinary person would interpret as a statement of provable fact. The trial court erred by ruling otherwise.

In sum, the trial court erred by ruling that Jha had presented a prima facie case of invasion of privacy by false light. To the contrary, Jha presents no evidence that the statements made by Khan were provably false. Because Jha failed to satisfy his burden of showing a prima facie case of invasion of privacy by false light, the trial court should have granted Khan’s UPEPA motion and dismissed Jha’s claims with prejudice.

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<sup>10</sup> Br. of Resp’t at 33-34.

VII

Although Jha's failure to establish a prima facie case was sufficient for the trial court to grant Khan's UPEPA motion, the trial court could also have granted the motion on the basis that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.<sup>11</sup> This is so because Khan has demonstrated that her statements were protected by the First Amendment's fair reporting privilege.

Certain privileges shield a speaker from liability for defamation and false light, regardless of the truth or falsity of the statement. Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 381. Washington law provides that a defendant's statements are privileged when the defendant is "reporting on defamatory statements contained in official proceedings and records." Clapp v. Olympic View Publ'g Co., 137 Wn. App. 470, 475-76, 154 P.3d 230 (2007) (citing Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 382). "[B]ecause the filing of a pleading is a public and official act in the course of judicial proceedings, the fair reporting privilege attaches to pleadings even if the court has yet to act on them." Clapp, 137 Wn. App. at 476.

We agree with amici Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 18 Media Organizations that the question of privilege must be addressed when ruling on a UPEPA motion. Here, the trial court determined that it could not decide whether Khan's speech was protected by either the United States or

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<sup>11</sup> Jha additionally argues that the UPEPA motion was properly denied under step two of the statutory analysis, asserting that his complaint falls under the exception outlined in RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(i). This argument is meritless. RCW 4.105.010(3)(a)(i) provides that UPEPA does not apply to a cause of action asserted "[a]gainst a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting or purporting to act in an official capacity." Jha's lawsuit was filed against Khan in her individual capacity only. Therefore, this exception does not apply.

Washington Constitutions because there were genuine issues of fact to be decided first. But it is not within the purview of the jury to ensure that a litigant's constitutional rights are respected. See Rogers, 502 P.3d at 995 (“[A] jury’s charge, unlike ours, does not include safeguarding freedom of speech.”); cf. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (jury finding of outrageousness cannot overcome constitutional right to picket). Rather, it is the trial court’s duty to address claims of privilege. This is especially important because:

“Serious problems regarding the exercise of free speech and free press guaranteed by the First Amendment are raised if unwarranted lawsuits are allowed to proceed to trial. The chilling effect of the pendency of such litigation can itself be sufficient to curtail the exercise of these freedoms.”

Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 485, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981) (quoting Tait v. KING Broad. Co., 1 Wn. App. 250, 255, 460 P.2d 307 (1969)); accord Sisley, 171 Wn. App. at 234.

Delaying assessment of the movant’s constitutional rights until *after* the jury finds facts entirely defeats the legislature’s intent in enacting UPEPA. See RCW 4.105.901 (“This chapter must be broadly construed and applied to protect the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and of the press, the right to assemble and petition, and the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Washington state Constitution.”). And, because UPEPA “is essentially an expedited summary judgment motion,” Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Bronner, 259 A.3d 728, 740 (D.C. 2021); see also RCW 4.105.060(1)(c)(ii)(B) (utilizing language identical to CR 56(c)), the trial court should not apply different evidentiary requirements than apply on summary judgment.



In most defamation and false light cases, the burden falls to the plaintiff to prove abuse of a conditional privilege. Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 61 Wn. App. 572, 587, 811 P.2d 231 (1991) (citing Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wn.2d 582, 601, 664 P.2d 492 (1983)). However, the fair reporting privilege is incapable of being abused; either the privilege applies or it does not. Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 385. The court determines this question as a matter of law. Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 386. If, on summary judgment, the court finds that the fair reporting privilege applies, the plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 386. Because a claim of false light must be dismissed on summary judgment when a constitutional privilege applies, so too must the claim be dismissed on a UPEPA motion when such a privilege applies.

Here, Khan's article stated that Jha was "involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse of his ex-girlfriend." Khan argues that the fair reporting privilege applies because her statement was a fair abridgement of the proceedings in the New York lawsuit against Jha.<sup>12</sup> Jha contends that the statement was not a fair abridgement of the proceedings, as Khan needed to qualify her statement as "allegations." But Washington law has no such requirement.

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<sup>12</sup> Appellants ask this court to take judicial notice of the existence of the New York lawsuit and the complaint filed therein. Respondent objects to this request. Both the complaint and the motion to dismiss filed in the New York lawsuit were provided to the trial court for consideration on the UPEPA motion. Neither party objected to the admissibility of these documents. We may therefore consider them as we would any other evidence submitted in conjunction with a dispositive motion. RAP 9.12.

Our recent decision in McNamara v. Koehler, 5 Wn. App. 2d 708, 429 P.3d 6 (2018), is controlling. Therein, attorney Koehler and her employer Stritmatter Kessler Whelan Koehler Moore Kahler (hereinafter SKW), a law firm, represented two clients in a wrongful death lawsuit against McNamara. SKW's website had a page dedicated to the case, which included a picture of McNamara with the caption "(McNamara) 'is wanted by the judicial authorities of Belize for prosecution to serve a sentence.'" McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 711. SKW's website also included a list of notable cases that the firm handled, including this blurb about the wrongful death suit: "The wrongful death case involves an alleged murder of Mr. McNamara by Defendant Tracy Nessler (a.k.a. Tracy McNamara). The motive is believed to include Ms. McNamara's wish to acquire Mr. McNamara's financial assets." McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 712 n.3. McNamara sued Koehler and SKW for defamation. McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 712.

We held that the fair reporting privilege applies to any type of media, including blogs and webpages, "so long as (1) the report is attributable to an official proceeding and (2) the report is an accurate or a fair abridgment of the official report." McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 716. We noted that "[f]or a report to be a fair abridgement of an official proceeding, surgical precision is not required so long as the report is substantially accurate and fair." McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 716 (quoting Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 386). Applying this to the alleged defamatory statements, we held that the statements that McNamara was wanted for murder and that her motive was to acquire the

decendent's property were all fair and accurate accounts of the allegations contained in the wrongful death complaint. McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 718-19. Although one sentence on the website did use the word "alleged," not all of the statements had similar qualifications, and we did not hold that such a qualification was necessary. McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 718-19.

In reviewing the complaint filed in the New York lawsuit, Khan's statement that Jha was "involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse" is an accurate abridgment thereof. The New York complaint against Jha contains numerous pages detailing the abuse that A.S. allegedly suffered at the hands of Jha. The complaint also contains allegations that Jha distributed nude photos of A.S. without her consent and asserts a claim under New York City's revenge porn ordinance. Although Khan's statement says nothing about the motion to dismiss that Jha filed in the New York court, as Khan correctly points out, it need not do so. We say this because "[m]erely omitting facts favorable to the plaintiff or facts that the plaintiff thinks should have been included does not make a publication false and subject to defamation liability." Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 827.

Jha nevertheless argues that, in order for the fair reporting privilege to apply, the statement must be *attributed to* an official proceeding, i.e., that the official proceeding must either be cited or linked to. We disagree. In Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d at 487, our Supreme Court adopted the articulation of the fair reporting privilege set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This articulation of the privilege includes neither the words "attributed to" nor the words "attributable to" but instead reads as follows:



The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

The court in Mark did not add anything to this articulation. Instead, its inquiry was directed toward identifying that which constitutes an official proceeding. Mark, 96 Wn.2d at 488-89. The court held that an affidavit of probable cause is a record of an official proceeding to which the privilege applies, but that the privilege did not apply to statements made by the prosecutor and investigator outside of the court record. Mark, 96 Wn.2d at 488-89. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions also did not add anything to the articulation of the fair reporting privilege adopted from the Restatement. See Herron v. Trib. Publ'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 179, 736 P.2d 249 (1987) (“Washington . . . recognized a conditional privilege protecting the republisher when the defamatory statement originally was made in the course of an official proceeding or contained in an official report.”).

In 2002, Division Three examined Restatement section 611 in depth. The court noted that the purpose of the fair reporting privilege is “to serve the public’s interest in obtaining information as to what transpires in official proceedings and public meetings.” Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 384. The court reasoned that the fair reporting privilege is broader than any other privilege found in the Restatement and may apply even when the publisher does not believe the official report is true. Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 384. Based on section 611 of the

Restatement and the comments thereto, the court held that “to determine whether a communication falls within the fair reporting privilege, we engage in two inquiries: (1) whether the report is attributable to an official proceeding; and (2) whether the report is accurate or a fair abridgement.” Alpine Indus., 114 Wn. App. at 384.

We have since adopted this articulation of the fair reporting privilege.<sup>13</sup> Momah v. Bharti, 144 Wn. App. 731, 745, 182 P.3d 455 (2008); accord McNamara, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 716. This articulation of the fair reporting privilege is consistent with federal law, which holds that it is not necessary to cite directly to the original source of the statement; rather, the privilege applies so long as it is apparent that the statement “is quoting, paraphrasing, or otherwise drawing upon official documents or proceedings.” Dameron v. Wash. Mag., Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985); accord Ditton v. Legal Times, 947 F. Supp. 227, 230 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 129 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1997); Pittman v. Gannett River States Publ’g Corp., 836 F. Supp. 377, 382-83 (S.D. Miss. 1993).

Khan’s statement that Jha was “involved in a legal case of revenge porn and abuse of his ex-girlfriend” is easily attributable to an official proceeding: the lawsuit filed in New York state court by A.S. Khan was not required to link to the docket in order for the privilege to apply. Because Khan’s statement was

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<sup>13</sup> The only Division Two opinion to examine the fair reporting privilege in the past two decades is Clapp v. Olympic View Publ’g Co., LLC, 137 Wn. App. 470, 154 P.3d 230 (2007). The court therein stated that “[t]he fair reporting privilege attaches to a report on official proceedings or records that (1) attributes the report to the official record and (2) is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the record.” Clapp, 137 Wn. App. at 477. Clapp cites Alpine Industries for this proposition, but offers no explanation for its altered articulation of the fair reporting privilege. Clapp, 137 Wn. App. at 477.



protected by the fair reporting privilege, the trial court could have granted Khan's UPEPA dismissal motion on this ground as well. Accordingly, we also reverse on this alternative basis.

## VIII

After hearing argument on Khan's UPEPA motion (but before issuing an order thereon), the trial court granted Jha's "Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint." Shortly thereafter, the trial court also granted Jha's motion to file a second amended complaint. Khan contends that the trial court erred by making these rulings because UPEPA provides that the proceedings were automatically stayed once the dismissal motion was timely filed.<sup>14</sup> We agree.

The pertinent statute provides:

During a stay under this section, the court for good cause may hear and rule on:

- (a) A motion unrelated to the motion under RCW 4.105.020;
- and
- (b) A motion seeking a special or preliminary injunction to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.

RCW 4.105.030(7).

The parties disagree as to whether Jha made the requisite showing of good cause. We need not resolve this issue because we decide the question presented on a different basis.

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<sup>14</sup> Jha contends that this court has no authority to review the orders lifting the stay because they are not appealable. Jha's argument relies upon a misreading of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although the orders are not individually appealable as a matter of right, pursuant to RCW 4.105.080, they are reviewable under RAP 2.4(a), having been designated in Khan's notice of appeal.

“When interpreting a statutory provision, courts ‘must give meaning to every word in a statute.’” Smith v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 22 Wn. App. 2d 500, 511, 512 P.3d 566 (2022) (quoting Bennett v. Seattle Mental Health, 166 Wn. App. 477, 483, 269 P.3d 1079 (2012)). RCW 4.105.030(7) does not authorize the trial court to lift the stay and entertain any motion upon a showing of good cause. Rather, the statute limits the type of motion that the trial court may consider. First, the trial court may hear a motion unrelated to the UPEPA motion. RCW 4.105.030(7)(a). Second, the trial court may hear a motion seeking a special or preliminary injunction that has been filed “to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.” RCW 4.105.030(7)(b). When the motion falls under one of those two categories, the trial court may lift the stay once the moving party demonstrates good cause. Had the legislature desired to permit the trial court to hear *any* motion upon a showing of good cause, it would have said so. Accordingly, a motion that does not fall under either of these two categories (and is not a motion for an award of costs, attorney fees, or expenses under RCW 4.105.090<sup>15</sup>) cannot be entertained while the UPEPA dismissal motion remains pending.

Jha’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is not one of the two types of motion that the trial court is authorized to entertain once the stay is in effect. Jha sought no special or preliminary injunctive relief. Neither was Jha’s motion unrelated to Khan’s UPEPA dismissal motion. Jha sought leave to

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<sup>15</sup> RCW 4.105.030(5) provides that “[a] motion under RCW 4.105.090 for costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses is not subject to a stay under this section.”

file a motion to amend his complaint—the very complaint that Khan was seeking to dismiss in its entirety in her UPEPA motion. In fact, Jha readily admitted that he was seeking to amend his complaint in order to avoid dismissal by virtue of Khan’s UPEPA motion.<sup>16</sup> Khan’s UPEPA prefiling notice had already granted Jha 14 days to amend his complaint to either remove meritless claims or assert meritorious ones before Khan was authorized to file her UPEPA motion and trigger the stay. RCW 4.105.020(1). But Jha did not do so.<sup>17</sup> It was only well after Khan filed her UPEPA motion that Jha expressed any desire to assert federal claims. Under these circumstances, Jha’s motion cannot reasonably be characterized as being unrelated to the UPEPA motion. Cf. JKC3H8 v. Colton, 221 Cal. App. 4th 468, 477-78, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450 (2013) (“A plaintiff . . . may not seek to subvert or avoid a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion by amending the challenged complaint . . . in response to the motion.”).

Because the trial court lacked statutory authority to hear *related* motions, even upon a showing of good cause, the trial court erred by entertaining Jha’s motion for leave to amend prior to resolving Khan’s UPEPA dismissal motion.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Jha argued in his motion to lift the stay that there was good cause to hear his motion for leave to amend because “federal claims are exempt from UPEPA’s purview.”

<sup>17</sup> Jha filed a motion to amend his complaint to remove his claims for defamation, invasion of privacy by publicity given to private facts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Khan did not object to the motion. Although the trial court did not grant the motion until after Khan filed her UPEPA motion, the trial court construed the UPEPA motion as applicable to the first amended complaint given the identical factual allegations.

<sup>18</sup> Khan further argues that the trial court should not have granted Jha’s motion to amend his complaint, as the federal claims asserted in the second amended complaint were futile. Due to the mandatory stay under RCW 4.105.030(7), the trial court should never have entertained Jha’s second motion to amend his complaint. Instead, the trial court should have granted Khan’s UPEPA motion, which would have resulted in dismissal of Jha’s lawsuit with prejudice.




Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must vacate both the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, entered on February 8, 2022, and the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, entered on March 3, 2022.

IX

Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. As the prevailing party, Khan is entitled to an award of fees pursuant to RAP 18.1 and RCW 4.105.090(1). Additionally, because we hold that the UPEPA motion should have been granted in Khan's favor, Khan is entitled to an award of fees incurred in the trial court pursuant to RCW 4.105.090(1). For the sake of judicial economy and to expedite relief, we instruct the trial court to make a determination as to the amount of attorney fees and costs awardable to Khan at both the trial and appellate level.<sup>19</sup>

Reversed and remanded.



WE CONCUR:



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<sup>19</sup> This should include an appropriate award of "reasonable litigation expenses," if any, as authorized by RCW 4.105.090.

# **APPENDIX B**

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

SIDDHARTH JHA,

Respondent,

v.

VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN and  
YASSIR ANWAR JAMAL, wife and  
husband,

Appellants.


DIVISION ONE

No. 83768-1-1

ORDER DENYING MOTION  
FOR RECONSIDERATION

The respondent having filed a motion for reconsideration herein, and a majority of the panel having determined that the motion should be denied; now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

FOR THE COURT:

A handwritten signature in black ink, written over a horizontal line. The signature is cursive and appears to be "D. J. [unclear]".

# **APPENDIX C**

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

SIDDHARTH JHA,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN and  
YASSIR ANWAR JAMAL, husband and  
wife,  
  
Defendants.

No. 21-2-14469-8 SEA

~~PROPOSED~~ ORDER GRANTING  
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR  
LEAVE TO FILE SECOND  
AMENDED COMPLAINT

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing before the undersigned Judge on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint; and the Court having reviewed:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint;
  2. Defendants' Response;
  3. Plaintiff's Reply;
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1 and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby **GRANTS** Plaintiff's Motion for  
2 Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff must file his Second Amended  
3 Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this Order.

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5 DONE this \_\_\_\_\_ day of 3/2, 2022.

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8 THE HONORABLE CHAD ALLRED  
9 King County Superior Court

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11 Presented by:

12 **ARETE LAW GROUP PLLC**

13  
14 By: /s/ Jeremy E. Roller  
15 Jeremy E. Roller, WSBA No. 32021  
16 1218 Third Avenue, Suite 2100  
17 Seattle, WA 98101  
18 Phone: (206) 428-3250  
19 jroller@aretelaw.com

20 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

# **APPENDIX D**

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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON  
COUNTY OF KING

SIDDHARTH JHA,

Plaintiff,

v.

VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN, et  
al.

Defendants.

No. 21-2-14469-8 SEA

**ORDER DENYING  
SUMMARY DISMISSAL**

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Defendants Varisha Khan and Yassir Jamal filed a Special Motion for Expedited Relief, seeking dismissal of this lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Siddharth Jha. The Court has considered the motion and all papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion,<sup>1</sup> as well as oral argument from counsel.

Based on the papers submitted, the Court determines that (a) plaintiff has established a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action of invasion of privacy by false light, and (b) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding, without limitation, the existence and scope of the alleged falsity

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<sup>1</sup> Sub ##28-29, 43-48, 51. See CR 56(h). A37

1 and Khan's knowledge or reckless disregard of the alleged falsity.

2 The Court also notes that disposition of the false light claim may ultimately  
3 turn on whether Khan's speech was protected by the First Amendment to the  
4 U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 5, of the Washington Constitution. But the  
5 free-speech protections that may apply cannot yet be decided in light of the  
6 genuine issues of material fact that currently exist.<sup>2</sup>  
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9 Therefore, it is ORDERED that Defendants' motion<sup>3</sup> is denied.

10  
11 March 1, 2022



12 Judge Chad Allred  
13 King County Superior Court

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26 <sup>2</sup> See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality op.) ("In [prior]  
27 decisions the falsity of the speech at issue was not irrelevant to our analysis, but neither was it  
28 determinative. . . . [T]he Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to  
bring the speech outside the First Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless  
falsehood.") (citations omitted).

<sup>3</sup> Sub #28.

# **APPENDIX E**

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

SIDDHARTH JHA,

Plaintiff,

v.

VARISHA MAHMOOD KHAN and  
YASSIR ANWAR JAMAL, husband and  
wife,

Defendants.

No. 21-2-14469-8 SEA

~~PROPOSED~~ ORDER GRANTING  
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR  
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR  
LEAVE TO FILE SECOND  
AMENDED COMPLAINT

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing before the undersigned Judge on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint ("Plaintiff's Motion"); and the Court having reviewed:

1. Plaintiff's Motion;
2. Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion; and
3. Plaintiff's Reply In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion;

and being fully advised; it is hereby **ORDERED**, as follows:

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is **GRANTED**. Plaintiff has established good cause to file his Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.

1 Plaintiff must file his Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint within  
2 ten (10) days of entry of this Order.

3 DONE IN OPEN COURT this 8th day of Feb., 2022.

4  
5 

6 THE HONORABLE CHAD ALLRED  
7 King County Superior Court

8 Presented by:

9 **ARETE LAW GROUP PLLC**

10  
11 By: /s/ Jeremy E. Roller  
12 Jeremy E. Roller, WSBA No. 32021  
13 1218 Third Avenue, Suite 2100  
14 Seattle, WA 98101  
15 Phone: (206) 428-3250  
16 jroller@aretelaw.com

17 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

**LAW OFFICE OF CARL J. MARQUARDT, PLLC**

**February 06, 2023 - 4:24 PM**

**Transmittal Information**

**Filed with Court:** Court of Appeals Division I  
**Appellate Court Case Number:** 83768-1  
**Appellate Court Case Title:** Siddharth Jha, Respondent v. Varisha Mahmood Khan, et ano, Appellants

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